Ondo Finance - Inspecktor's results

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L85-L114

Vulnerability details

Impact

DestinationBridge._execute() is a function that is executed when contract is called by Axelar Gateway (https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L85 -L114). The function calculates bytes32 txnHash = keccak256(payload). txnHash is calculated based on payload. However, srcChain is not taken into account in payload.

(bytes32 version, address srcSender, uint256 amt, uint256 nonce) = abi .decode(payload, (bytes32, address, uint256, uint256));

Let's assume that a request with the same version, srcSender, amt, nonce has been received from different srcChain. This could very well happen. For these different requests, you get the same txnHash:

bytes32 txnHash = keccak256(payload);

This may result in the deletion of the valid txnHash. This will cancel the first txnHash and all its votes, as the current txnHash will replace the new one txnHashToTransaction[txnHash] = Transaction(srcSender, amt);

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Add srcChain to payload.

Assessed type

Context

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L672-L683 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L678 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L626-L655

Vulnerability details

Impact

There are functions for blocking users: setBlocklist() - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L698-L702 setAllowlist() - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L709-L713 setSanctionsList() - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L720-L724

Suppose the user has rUSDY tokens. Then it was added to the blocklist. His tokens will then be blocked.

There is a burn() function (https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L672-L683) where you can burn rUSDY tokens from any account . If a user is locked out, then their position must be forced to burn() in order for them to get their USDY tokens back. However, it is not possible to call the burn() function on a blocked user.

Proof of Concept

The burn() function calls the _burnShares() function (https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L678). The _burnShares() function contains _beforeTokenTransfer() (https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L626-L655) which returns an error if the user is on the blocklist or not on the whitelist. So calling burn() will return an error.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Remove _beforeTokenTransfer() call from _burnShares() function

Assessed type

Context