Centrifuge - Phantasmagoria's results

The institutional ecosystem for on-chain credit.

General Information

Platform: Code4rena

Start Date: 08/09/2023

Pot Size: $70,000 USDC

Total HM: 8

Participants: 84

Period: 6 days

Judge: gzeon

Total Solo HM: 2

Id: 285

League: ETH

Centrifuge

Findings Distribution

Researcher Performance

Rank: 47/84

Findings: 1

Award: $50.43

🌟 Selected for report: 0

🚀 Solo Findings: 0

Awards

50.4324 USDC - $50.43

Labels

bug
2 (Med Risk)
satisfactory
sufficient quality report
duplicate-34

External Links

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/main/src/InvestmentManager.sol#L396-L406 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/main/src/InvestmentManager.sol#L599 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/main/src/InvestmentManager.sol#L614

Vulnerability details

Impact

Per EIP 4626's Security Considerations (https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4626)

"Finally, ERC-4626 Vault implementers should be aware of the need for specific, opposing rounding directions across the different mutable and view methods, as it is considered most secure to favor the Vault itself during calculations over its users: If (1) it’s calculating how many shares to issue to a user for a certain amount of the underlying tokens they provide or (2) it’s determining the amount of the underlying tokens to transfer to them for returning a certain amount of shares, it should round down. If (1) it’s calculating the amount of shares a user has to supply to receive a given amount of the underlying tokens or (2) it’s calculating the amount of underlying tokens a user has to provide to receive a certain amount of shares, it should round up."

Other protocols that integrate with a vault might wrongly assume that the functions handle rounding as per ERC4626 expectation. Thus, it might cause some intergration problem in the future that can lead to wide range of issues for both parties.

Proof of Concept

function previewWithdraw(address user, address liquidityPool, uint256 _currencyAmount) public view returns (uint256 trancheTokenAmount) { uint128 currencyAmount = _toUint128(_currencyAmount); uint256 redeemPrice = calculateRedeemPrice(user, liquidityPool); if (redeemPrice == 0) return 0; trancheTokenAmount = uint256(_calculateTrancheTokenAmount(currencyAmount, liquidityPool, redeemPrice)); }
function _calculateTrancheTokenAmount(uint128 currencyAmount, address liquidityPool, uint256 price) internal view returns (uint128 trancheTokenAmount) { (uint8 currencyDecimals, uint8 trancheTokenDecimals) = _getPoolDecimals(liquidityPool); uint256 currencyAmountInPriceDecimals = _toPriceDecimals(currencyAmount, currencyDecimals, liquidityPool).mulDiv( 10 ** PRICE_DECIMALS, price, MathLib.Rounding.Down ); trancheTokenAmount = _fromPriceDecimals(currencyAmountInPriceDecimals, trancheTokenDecimals, liquidityPool); }

Note that previewDeposit and previewMint also rounds down

).mulDiv(price, 10 ** PRICE_DECIMALS, MathLib.Rounding.Down);

Tools Used

Manual Review

Round up in previewWithdraw

Assessed type

ERC4626

#0 - c4-pre-sort

2023-09-15T07:12:33Z

raymondfam marked the issue as sufficient quality report

#1 - c4-pre-sort

2023-09-15T07:12:46Z

raymondfam marked the issue as duplicate of #34

#2 - c4-judge

2023-09-26T18:11:29Z

gzeon-c4 marked the issue as satisfactory

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