Panoptic - Vancelot's results

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-04-panoptic/blob/main/contracts/PanopticPool.sol#L333-L344 https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-04-panoptic/blob/main/contracts/PanopticFactory.sol#L328-L411

Vulnerability details

Impact

The returned parameter currentSqrtPriceX96 from slot0 can be easily manipulated with a flashloan, resulting in a loss of funds.

Proof of Concept

The first function that calls slot0 and uses the returned price is assertPriceWithinBounds in PanopticPool.sol:

    function assertPriceWithinBounds(uint160 sqrtLowerBound, uint160 sqrtUpperBound) external view {
        (uint160 currentSqrtPriceX96,,,,,,) = s_univ3pool.slot0();

        if (currentSqrtPriceX96 <= sqrtLowerBound || currentSqrtPriceX96 >= sqrtUpperBound) {
            revert Errors.PriceBoundFail();
        }
    }

One of the comments for this function states that it can be used in a multicall, as a slippage check, for a force exercise or liquidation. If a malicious user were to front-run the call to this function with a flashloan, they could bump up the price so that their options aren't exercised or their account isn't liquidated.

The second function that utilizes slot0 is _mintFullRange in PanopticFactory.sol:

    function _mintFullRange(IUniswapV3Pool v3Pool, address token0, address token1, uint24 fee)
        internal
        returns (uint256, uint256)
    {
        (uint160 currentSqrtPriceX96,,,,,,) = v3Pool.slot0();

        uint128 fullRangeLiquidity;
        unchecked {
            // Since we know one of the tokens is WETH, we simply add 0.1 ETH + worth in tokens
            if (token0 == WETH) {
                fullRangeLiquidity =
                    uint128(Math.mulDiv96RoundingUp(FULL_RANGE_LIQUIDITY_AMOUNT_WETH, currentSqrtPriceX96));
            } else if (token1 == WETH) {
                fullRangeLiquidity = uint128(
                    Math.mulDivRoundingUp(FULL_RANGE_LIQUIDITY_AMOUNT_WETH, Constants.FP96, currentSqrtPriceX96)
                .....

A malicious user could manipulate the price so that the newly created SFPM is deployed with more liquidity than intended.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

I suggest refactoring the functions, in order for them to use Uniswap's TWAP, as it's the safer choice.

Assessed type

Oracle