xTRIBE contest - defsec's results

A TRIBE tokenomic upgrade with multi-delegation, autocompounding rewards, and reward delegation

General Information

Platform: Code4rena

Start Date: 21/04/2022

Pot Size: $75,000 USDC

Total HM: 7

Participants: 45

Period: 7 days

Judge: 0xean

Total Solo HM: 5

Id: 111

League: ETH

Tribe

Findings Distribution

Researcher Performance

Rank: 16/45

Findings: 2

Award: $293.84

🌟 Selected for report: 0

🚀 Solo Findings: 0

Awards

192.8881 USDC - $192.89

Labels

bug
QA (Quality Assurance)
sponsor todo

External Links

C4-001 :Use safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom consistently instead of transfer/transferFrom

Impact - LOW

Impact

It is good to add a require() statement that checks the return value of token transfers or to use something like OpenZeppelin’s safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom unless one is sure the given token reverts in case of a failure. Failure to do so will cause silent failures of transfers and affect token accounting in contract.

Reference: This similar medium-severity finding from Consensys Diligence Audit of Fei Protocol: https://consensys.net/diligence/audits/2021/01/fei-protocol/#unchecked-return-value-for-iweth-transfer-call

Proof of Concept

  1. Navigate to the following contract.

  2. transfer/transferFrom functions are used instead of safe transfer/transferFrom on the following contracts.

https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L134 https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L137

Tools Used

Code Review

Consider using safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom or require() consistently.

C4-002 : Use of Block.timestamp

Impact - Non-Critical

Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the Entropy Illusion for further details), locking funds for periods of time, and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent. Miners have the ability to adjust timestamps slightly, which can prove to be dangerous if block timestamps are used incorrectly in smart contracts.

Proof of Concept

  1. Navigate to the following contract.
https://github.com/fei-protocol/ERC4626/blob/643cd044fac34bcbf64e1c3790a5126fec0dbec1/src/xERC4626.sol#L80

Tools Used

Manual Code Review

Block timestamps should not be used for entropy or generating random numbers—i.e., they should not be the deciding factor (either directly or through some derivation) for winning a game or changing an important state.

Time-sensitive logic is sometimes required; e.g., for unlocking contracts (time-locking), completing an ICO after a few weeks, or enforcing expiry dates. It is sometimes recommended to use block.number and an average block time to estimate times; with a 10 second block time, 1 week equates to approximately, 60480 blocks. Thus, specifying a block number at which to change a contract state can be more secure, as miners are unable to easily manipulate the block number.

C4-003 : PREVENT DIV BY 0

Impact

On several locations in the code precautions are taken not to divide by 0, because this will revert the code. However on some locations this isn’t done.

Especially in the claim function div(initialStake - claimedInitialStake) which isn’t checked.

That will cause to revert on the claim function.

Proof of Concept

  1. Navigate to the following contract,

"https://github.com/fei-protocol/ERC4626/blob/643cd044fac34bcbf64e1c3790a5126fec0dbec1/src/xERC4626.sol#L38"

  1. rewardsCycleLength can be same and the substraction operation will be equal to zero therefore div by zero will occur.

Tools Used

Review

Recommend making sure division by 0 won’t occur by checking the variables beforehand and handling this edge case.

C4-004 : # Missing zero-address check in the setter functions and initiliazers

Impact

Missing checks for zero-addresses may lead to infunctional protocol, if the variable addresses are updated incorrectly.

Proof of Concept

  1. Navigate to the following contracts.
https://github.com/fei-protocol/ERC4626/blob/643cd044fac34bcbf64e1c3790a5126fec0dbec1/src/xERC4626.sol#L38 https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L33

Tools Used

Code Review

Consider adding zero-address checks in the discussed constructors: require(newAddr != address(0));.

C4-005 : Owner does not have set function

Impact

During the code review, It has been observed that owner is only set in the constructor. It is not inherited from the Ownable (Openzeppelin contract.) If the owner is deployed mistakenly with zero address/wrong address, access will be lost.

Proof of Concept

  1. Navigate to the following contracts.
https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L35

Tools Used

Code Review

Consider inheriting contract from Openzeppelin Ownable contract.

Awards

100.9514 USDC - $100.95

Labels

bug
G (Gas Optimization)
sponsor todo

External Links

C4-001 : ++i is more gas efficient than i++ in loops forwarding

Impact

++i is more gas efficient than i++ in loops forwarding.

Proof of Concept

  1. Navigate to the following contracts.
https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L95

Tools Used

Code Review

It is recommend to use unchecked{++i} and change i declaration to uint256.

C4-002 : There is no need to assign default values to variables

Impact - Gas Optimization

When a variable is declared solidity assigns the default value. In case the contract assigns the value again, it costs extra gas.

Example: uint x = 0 costs more gas than uint x without having any different functionality.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L95

Tools Used

Code Review

uint x = 0 costs more gas than uint x without having any different functionality.

C4-003 : Free gas savings for using solidity 0.8.10+

Impact

Using newer compiler versions and the optimizer gives gas optimizations and additional safety checks are available for free.

Proof of Concept

All Contracts

Solidity 0.8.10 has a useful change which reduced gas costs of external calls which expect a return value: https://blog.soliditylang.org/2021/11/09/solidity-0.8.10-release-announcement/

Code Generator: Skip existence check for external contract if return data is expected. In this case, the ABI decoder will revert if the contract does not exist

All Contracts

Tools Used

None

Consider to upgrade pragma to at least 0.8.10.

C4-004 : Non-strict inequalities are cheaper than strict ones

Impact

Strict inequalities add a check of non equality which costs around 3 gas.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L95

Tools Used

Code Review

Use >= or <= instead of > and < when possible.

C4-005 : Check if amount > 0 before token transfer can save gas

Impact

Since _amount can be 0. Checking if (_amount != 0) before the transfer can potentially save an external call and the unnecessary gas cost of a 0 token transfer.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L134 https://github.com/fei-protocol/xTRIBE/blob/989e47d176facbb0c38bc1e1ca58672f179159e1/src/xTRIBE.sol#L149

All Contracts

Tools Used

None

Consider checking amount != 0.

C4-006 : Use Shift Right/Left instead of Division/Multiplication if possible

Impact

A division/multiplication by any number x being a power of 2 can be calculated by shifting log2(x) to the right/left.

While the DIV opcode uses 5 gas, the SHR opcode only uses 3 gas. Furthermore, Solidity's division operation also includes a division-by-0 prevention which is bypassed using shifting.

Code Location

https://github.com/fei-protocol/ERC4626/blob/643cd044fac34bcbf64e1c3790a5126fec0dbec1/src/xERC4626.sol#L89

Tools Used

None

A division/multiplication by any number x being a power of 2 can be calculated by shifting log2(x) to the right/left.

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