Canto Identity Subprotocols contest - reassor's results

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L103-L115

Vulnerability details

Impact

The Bio Protocol allows users to mint Bio NFTs that represent user's bio. Once NFT is minted anyone can trigger tokenURI to retrieve JSON data with the bio and generated svg image. Example JSON content (decoded from Base64):

{"name": "Bio #1", "description": "Test", "image": ""}

The issue is that function Bio.tokenURI is vulnerable to JSON injection and it is possible to inject " character into bio completely altering the integrity of JSON data. User sends following data as bio:

Test\", \"name\": \"Bio #999999999

This is will result in following JSON data (new name key was injected):

{"name": "Bio #1", "description": "Test", "name": "Bio #999999999", "image": ""}

Depending on the usage of Bio Protocol by frontend or 3rd party applications this will have serious impact on the security. Some examples of the attacks that can be carried:

1. Attacker might create a Bio NFT that mimics copies the name of different Bio NFT.
2. Attacker might change the generated svg image to completely different one.
3. Attacker might point image to external URL.
4. Attacker might trigger cross-site scripting attacks if the data from JSON is not properly handled.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L103-L115

Tools Used

Manual Review / Foundry / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to properly encode user's bio to make sure it cannot alter returned JSON data.

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L97-L102

Vulnerability details

Impact

It is possible to inject bio that is a valid javascript code into generated on-chain SVG image. Attacker might pass following payload as bio:

<script>alert(1234)</script>

which will result in generation of SVG image with the code:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" preserveAspectRatio="xMinYMin meet" viewBox="0 0 400 100"><style>text { font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 12px; }</style><text x="50%" y="50%" dominant-baseline="middle" text-anchor="middle"><tspan x="50%" dy="20"><script>alert(1234)</script></tspan></text></svg>

SVG image like that included anywhere on a website will trigger javascript code of the attacker (in this case alert(1234)) that can compromise browser of every user viewing the image.

Following scenario is particularly dangerous:

1. Website allows viewing users bio's and generated SVG images.
2. Attacker creates bio that is a javascript code that redirects users to malicious copy of the website.
3. Any user that visits the website executes attacker's code and gets redirected to malicious website.
4. Users loose funds because of interactions with malicious website.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L97-L102

Tools Used

Manual Review / Foundry / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to properly encode user's bio to make sure it will not alter SVG image and inject Javascript code.

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L150-L168

Vulnerability details

Impact

Function buy of Tray contract allows buying specified amount of trays. Algorithm used for generating tiles per tray is deterministic to allow users to see what trays he/she will receive. This is also stipulated in the documentation README.md:

The 7 tiles per tray are then generated according to a deterministic algorithm. A user can therefore precompute which trays he will get.

Implementation of such a feature could be presented to the user in the frontend by displaying trays will tiles that will be minted if the user buys it.

The issue is that the call to Tray.buy can be frontrunned making this assumption incorrect and resulting with user spending $NOTE tokens on trays with tiles she didn't expect/want. Moreover this might happen also in the situation where there are no malicious actors but only two users buying trays at the same time.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L150-L168

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to add _lastHash parameter to Tray.buy function and compare it with the current saved lastHash. In case these values are different the transaction should be reverted.

List

Low Risk

1. Bio Protocol - Discrepancies between docs and implementation
2. Namespace Protocol - Not following checks-effects-interactions pattern
3. Namespace Protocol - Critical address change
4. Namespace Protocol - Frontrunning buy with change of NOTE address

Non-Critical Risk

5. Bio Protocol - Usage of _mint instead of _safeMint
6. Profile Picture Protocol - Can mint multiple PFP NFT pointing to the same NFT
7. Profile Picture Protocol - Can mint PFP NFT to PFP NFT
8. Namespace Protocol - revenueAddress is private
9. Namespace Protocol - missing delete of nftCharacters
10. Missing natspec
11. Missing pause functionality

1. Bio Protocol - Discrepancies between docs and implementation

Risk

Low

Impact

Bio Protocol documentation README.md states that bio has to be shorter than 200 characters:

Any user can mint a Bio NFT by calling Bio.mint and passing his biography. It needs to be shorter than 200 characters.

but the implementation allows bio with 200 characters and only reverts if the bio is longer than 200 characters:

if (bytes(_bio).length == 0 || bytes(_bio).length > 200) revert InvalidBioLength(bytes(_bio).length);

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L123

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to either fix documentation to reflect that bio can be maximum of 200 characters or adjust implementation and revert if bio length is 200 or more characters.

2. Namespace Protocol - Not following checks-effects-interactions pattern

Risk

Low

Impact

Functions Tray.buy and Namespace.fuse do not follow checks-effects-interactions pattern which might lead to reentrancy attacks.

Proof of Concept

Tray.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L150-L168

Namespace.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L110-L180

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to first set the effects of Tray.buy and Namespace.fuse functions and then charge the cost in the end of execution via SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom.

3. Namespace Protocol - Critical address change

Risk

Low

Impact

Changing critical addresses such as ownership should be a two-step process where the first transaction (from the old/current address) registers the new address (i.e. grants ownership) and the second transaction (from the new address) replaces the old address with the new one. This gives an opportunity to recover from incorrect addresses mistakenly used in the first step. If not, contract functionality might become inaccessible.

Proof of Concept

Tray.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L13

Namespace.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L11

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to implement two-step process for changing ownership.

4. Namespace Protocol - Frontrunning buy with change of NOTE address

Risk

Low

Impact

Functions Tray.buy and Namespace.fuse allow buying specified amount of trays or fusing by paying with $NOTE token. The issue is that the address of $NOTE token can be changed at any time by the owner which might cause issue if the user approved contract Tray or Namespace to spend any other token than $NOTE. Owner might frontrun user and change the address of $NOTE token to address of the token user didn't intend to spend.

Proof of Concept

Tray.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L157
• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L210-L214

Namespace.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L114
• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L196-L200

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to add _noteAddr parameter to Tray.buy and Namespace.fuse and revert if _noteAddr is different than note address.

5. Usage of _mint instead of _safeMint

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

Functions Bio.mint and ProfilePicture.mint are using _mint internal function instead of _safeMint to mint ERC721 tokens. This might lead to issue if the function is triggered by another smart contract that does not support ERC721 tokens and tokens will get stuck in Bio or ProfilePicture contracts.

Proof of Concept

Bio.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L126

ProfilePicture.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L86

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Consider using _safeMint instead of _mint but make sure to not expose contracts to reentrancy attacks.

6. Profile Picture Protocol - Can mint multiple PFP NFT pointing to the same NFT

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

The Profile Picture Protocol allows minting multiple PFP NFTs pointing to the same underlying NFT. This might cause issues if there will be any authorization mechanism implemented by 3rd party protocol that uses PFP NFTs.

Proof of Concept

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L79-L88

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Consider adding check that will prohibit minting new PFP NFTs in case there is already one owned by the user.

7. Profile Picture Protocol - Can mint PFP NFT to PFP NFT

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

Function ProfilePicture.mint allows minting PFP NFTs of another PFP NFTs. Since ProfilePicture.tokenURI points to the tokenURI of the underlying NFT it creates chain of NFTs. This might cause issues if there will be any authorization mechanism implemented by 3rd party protocol that uses PFP NFTs.

Proof of Concept

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L79-L88
• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L70-L74

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Consider adding check that will prohibit minting PFP NFTs of the PFP NFTs.

8. Namespace Protocol - revenueAddress is private

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

Storage variable revenueAddress of Tray and Namespace contracts is private which makes it difficult to query its value.

Proof of Concept

Tray.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L44

Namespace.sol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L23

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to make revenueAddress public so it will be easy to query its value and add transparency to the protocol.

9. Namespace Protocol - missing delete of nftCharacters

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

Function Namespace.burn allows burning specified Namespace NFT. It deletes tokenToName and nameToToken storage variables and then triggers internal _burn function. The issue is that its missing deleting nftCharacters.

Proof of Concept

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L184-L192

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to delete nftCharacters for the specified Namespace NFT in Namespace.burn function.

10. Missing natspec

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

Multiple contracts are missing natspec comments which makes code more difficult to read and prone to errors.

Proof of Concept

Bio.sol:

• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L40-L43

ProfilePicture.sol:

• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L67-L70

Tray.sol:

• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L117-L119
• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L191-L195
• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L200-L203
• Missing natspec params for _drawing function - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L245
• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L276

Namespace.sol:

• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L88-L90

Utils.sol:

• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol#L69-L73
• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol#L219-L222
• Missing @return param - https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol#L263-L270

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to add missing natspec comments.

11. Missing pause functionality

Risk

Non-Critical

Impact

Protocols Bio, Profile Picture and Namespace are missing pause functionality that could be used in case of security incidents and would block executing selected functions while the contracts are paused.

Proof of Concept

Namespace protocol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol

Bio protocol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol

Profile picture protocol:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol

Tools Used

Manual Review / VSCode

Recommended Mitigation Steps

It is recommended to add functionality for pausing contracts and go through all publicly/externally accessible functions to decide which one should be forbidden from running while the contracts are paused.