Platform: Code4rena
Start Date: 30/10/2023
Pot Size: $49,250 USDC
Total HM: 14
Participants: 243
Period: 14 days
Judge: 0xsomeone
Id: 302
League: ETH
Rank: 206/243
Findings: 1
Award: $0.00
🌟 Selected for report: 0
🚀 Solo Findings: 0
🌟 Selected for report: smiling_heretic
Also found by: 00decree, 00xSEV, 0x180db, 0x3b, 0x656c68616a, 0xAadi, 0xAleko, 0xAsen, 0xDetermination, 0xJuda, 0xMAKEOUTHILL, 0xMango, 0xMosh, 0xSwahili, 0x_6a70, 0xarno, 0xgrbr, 0xpiken, 0xsagetony, 3th, 8olidity, ABA, AerialRaider, Al-Qa-qa, Arabadzhiev, AvantGard, CaeraDenoir, ChrisTina, DanielArmstrong, DarkTower, DeFiHackLabs, Deft_TT, Delvir0, Draiakoo, Eigenvectors, Fulum, Greed, HChang26, Haipls, Hama, Inference, Jiamin, JohnnyTime, Jorgect, Juntao, Kaysoft, Kose, Kow, Krace, MaNcHaSsS, Madalad, MrPotatoMagic, Neon2835, NoamYakov, Norah, Oxsadeeq, PENGUN, REKCAH, Ruhum, Shubham, Silvermist, Soul22, SovaSlava, SpicyMeatball, Talfao, TermoHash, The_Kakers, Toshii, TuringConsulting, Udsen, VAD37, Vagner, Zac, Zach_166, ZdravkoHr, _eperezok, ak1, aldarion, alexfilippov314, alexxander, amaechieth, aslanbek, ast3ros, audityourcontracts, ayden, bdmcbri, bird-flu, blutorque, bronze_pickaxe, btk, c0pp3rscr3w3r, c3phas, cartlex_, cccz, ciphermarco, circlelooper, crunch, cryptothemex, cu5t0mpeo, darksnow, degensec, dethera, devival, dimulski, droptpackets, epistkr, evmboi32, fibonacci, gumgumzum, immeas, innertia, inzinko, jasonxiale, joesan, ke1caM, kimchi, lanrebayode77, lsaudit, mahyar, max10afternoon, merlin, mrudenko, nuthan2x, oakcobalt, openwide, orion, phoenixV110, pontifex, r0ck3tz, rotcivegaf, rvierdiiev, seeques, shenwilly, sl1, slvDev, t0x1c, tallo, tnquanghuy0512, tpiliposian, trachev, twcctop, vangrim, volodya, xAriextz, xeros, xuwinnie, y4y, yobiz, zhaojie
0 USDC - $0.00
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-nextgen/blob/main/smart-contracts/AuctionDemo.sol#L57
Detailed description of the impact of this finding.
Participating in auction requires a higher bid to successfully call participateToAuction
function :
function participateToAuction(uint256 _tokenid) public payable { require(msg.value > returnHighestBid(_tokenid) && block.timestamp <= minter.getAuctionEndTime(_tokenid) && minter.getAuctionStatus(_tokenid) == true); auctionInfoStru memory newBid = auctionInfoStru(msg.sender, msg.value, true); auctionInfoData[_tokenid].push(newBid); }
And anyone can cancels his bid before the auction ends :
function cancelBid(uint256 _tokenid, uint256 index) public { require(block.timestamp <= minter.getAuctionEndTime(_tokenid), "Auction ended"); require(auctionInfoData[_tokenid][index].bidder == msg.sender && auctionInfoData[_tokenid][index].status == true); auctionInfoData[_tokenid][index].status = false; (bool success, ) = payable(auctionInfoData[_tokenid][index].bidder).call{value: auctionInfoData[_tokenid][index].bid}(""); emit CancelBid(msg.sender, _tokenid, index, success, auctionInfoData[_tokenid][index].bid); }
This arises an exploit scenario where an attacker can win the auction with bare minimum price :
exploit :
participateToAuction
function works perfectly as there was no previous bid .participateToAuction
function requires the bid to be larger than 10000 eth .Review
Bids should be refunded after auction ends . The implementation should be in this way .
DoS
#0 - c4-pre-sort
2023-11-20T12:51:38Z
141345 marked the issue as duplicate of #962
#1 - c4-judge
2023-12-02T15:12:12Z
alex-ppg marked the issue as not a duplicate
#2 - c4-judge
2023-12-02T15:14:26Z
alex-ppg marked the issue as duplicate of #1784
#3 - c4-judge
2023-12-07T11:50:59Z
alex-ppg marked the issue as duplicate of #1323
#4 - c4-judge
2023-12-08T17:16:39Z
alex-ppg marked the issue as partial-25
#5 - c4-judge
2023-12-08T17:27:50Z
alex-ppg marked the issue as satisfactory
#6 - c4-judge
2023-12-08T17:53:33Z
alex-ppg marked the issue as partial-25