Stader Labs - MohammedRizwan's results

Decentralized ETH liquid staking protocol with 4 ETH bond for anyone to be a node operator.

General Information

Platform: Code4rena

Start Date: 02/06/2023

Pot Size: $100,000 USDC

Total HM: 15

Participants: 75

Period: 7 days

Judge: Picodes

Total Solo HM: 5

Id: 249

League: ETH

Stader Labs

Findings Distribution

Researcher Performance

Rank: 48/75

Findings: 1

Award: $31.80

🌟 Selected for report: 0

🚀 Solo Findings: 0

Awards

31.7954 USDC - $31.80

Labels

bug
2 (Med Risk)
satisfactory
duplicate-15

External Links

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-stader/blob/7566b5a35f32ebd55d3578b8bd05c038feb7d9cc/contracts/StaderOracle.sol#L646-L649

Vulnerability details

Impact

The getPORFeedData() function in the contract StaderOracle.sol fetches the asset price from a Chainlink aggregator using the latestRoundData function. However, there are no checks on roundID, resulting in stale prices. The oracle wrapper calls out to a chainlink oracle receiving the latestRoundData().

Stale prices could put funds at risk. According to Chainlink's documentation, This function does not error if no answer has been reached but returns 0, causing an incorrect price fed to the PriceOracle. The external Chainlink oracle, which provides index price information to the system, introduces risk inherent to any dependency on third-party data sources. For example, the oracle could fall behind or otherwise fail to be maintained, resulting in outdated data being fed to the index price calculations. Oracle reliance has historically resulted in crippled on-chain systems, and complications that lead to these outcomes can arise from things as simple as network congestion. These impact validation missing can be seen below in StaderOracle.getPORFeedData().

File: contracts/StaderOracle.sol

        (, int256 totalETHBalanceInInt, , , ) = AggregatorV3Interface(staderConfig.getETHBalancePORFeedProxy())
            .latestRoundData();
        (, int256 totalETHXSupplyInInt, , , ) = AggregatorV3Interface(staderConfig.getETHXSupplyPORFeedProxy())
            .latestRoundData();
        return (uint256(totalETHBalanceInInt), uint256(totalETHXSupplyInInt), block.number);
    }

As seen in code, the function has used latestRoundData() but it has no checks for stale price and the impact is explained above in detail.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-stader/blob/7566b5a35f32ebd55d3578b8bd05c038feb7d9cc/contracts/StaderOracle.sol#L646-L649

Tools Used

Manual review

Consider adding missing checks for stale data.

For example:


(uint80 roundID, int256 feedPrice, , uint256 timestamp, uint80 answeredInRound) = feed.latestRoundData();
require(feedPrice > 0, "Chainlink price <= 0"); 
require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Stale price");
require(timestamp != 0, "Round not complete");

Assessed type

Oracle

#0 - c4-judge

2023-06-09T23:25:08Z

Picodes marked the issue as duplicate of #15

#1 - c4-judge

2023-07-02T10:49:16Z

Picodes marked the issue as satisfactory

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