Maia DAO Ecosystem - Oxsadeeq's results

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-maia/blob/main/src/talos/base/TalosBaseStrategy.sol#L182

Vulnerability details

Impact

Detailed description of the impact of this finding. When depositiing liquidity to a position or initializing a position,WithdrawingAll liqudity from a position the Amount0Min and Amount1Min are hardcoded to 0.When depositing/initializing setting minimum values to zero means that the minimum amount of token1 and token0 that should be taken from the protocol should be Zero, this could easily exploited by Mev attacks to make profit same with the withdrawal means the agreeable minimum value accepted by the protocol should be Zero.Mev bots could easily make some money due to the absence of slippage protection in the trade.

Proof of Concept

Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. (_tokenId, _liquidity, amount0, amount1) = _nonfungiblePositionManager.mint( INonfungiblePositionManager.MintParams({ token0: address(_token0), token1: address(_token1), fee: poolFee, tickLower: tickLower, tickUpper: tickUpper, amount0Desired: amount0Desired, amount1Desired: amount1Desired, amount0Min: 0, amount1Min: 0, recipient: address(this), deadline: block.timestamp }) );

Tools Used:Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps:Make the variable dynamic instead

Assessed type

MEV