Platform: Code4rena
Start Date: 02/08/2022
Pot Size: $50,000 USDC
Total HM: 12
Participants: 69
Period: 5 days
Judge: gzeon
Total Solo HM: 5
Id: 150
League: ETH
Rank: 54/69
Findings: 1
Award: $67.51
🌟 Selected for report: 0
🚀 Solo Findings: 0
🌟 Selected for report: IllIllI
Also found by: 0x1f8b, 0xDjango, 0xNazgul, 0xc0ffEE, 8olidity, Bnke0x0, Chom, CodingNameKiki, Deivitto, Dravee, Funen, JC, JohnSmith, NoamYakov, ReyAdmirado, Rohan16, Rolezn, Sm4rty, SooYa, TomFrenchBlockchain, TomJ, Waze, __141345__, ajtra, ak1, aysha, bin2chen, bobirichman, brgltd, bulej93, c3phas, delfin454000, durianSausage, erictee, fatherOfBlocks, gogo, horsefacts, hyh, ladboy233, mics, natzuu, nxrblsrpr, oyc_109, rbserver, samruna, sikorico, simon135, tofunmi, wagmi
67.5073 USDC - $67.51
A call to MIMOProxy.multicall
may terminate without performing all the actions expected by the user. This can leave the vault in a state where it leaks value if it performing an action which opens a temporary MEV opportunity.
If we snip away access control and error handling from MIMOProxy.multicall
we have the function as shown:
function multicall(address[] calldata targets, bytes[] calldata data) external override returns (bytes[] memory) { /* snip */ bytes[] memory results = new bytes[](data.length); for (uint256 i = 0; i < targets.length; i++) { (bool success, bytes memory response) = targets[i].call(data[i]); /* snip */ results[i] = response; } return results; }
Note that we write targets.length
elements into an array of length data.length
.
Consider the case where a user wants to perform an action temporarily creates a MEV opportunity. e.g. interacting with a contract which performs "lazy" minting of tokens such as Element finance.
In this example the contract would perform two calls, one to the token contract to perform a transfer to Element finance and another to mint the corresponding amount of wrapped position tokens, and the arguments (in psuedocode) are then
targets = [0xtokenContract, 0xelementFinance] data=[0xtransfer, 0xprefundedDeposit]
However if the user manages to mangle their arguments so that they actually pass
targets = [0xtokenContract] data=[0xtransfer, 0xprefundedDeposit]
then multicall
will still accept this input but will terminate after the first external call, the remaining elements of the data
array will not be used. MIMOProxy
will then transfer the tokens out of the user's vault but not receive anything in return.
Add an explicit check for the lengths of these two arrays to be equal.
function multicall(address[] calldata targets, bytes[] calldata data) external override returns (bytes[] memory) { + if (targets.length != data.length) { + revert CustomErrors.TARGETS_LENGTH_DIFFERENT_THAN_DATA_LENGTH(targets.length, data.length); + } if (msg.sender != owner) { revert CustomErrors.NOT_OWNER(owner, msg.sender); } bytes[] memory results = new bytes[](data.length); for (uint256 i = 0; i < targets.length; i++) { (bool success, bytes memory response) = targets[i].call(data[i]); if (!success) { if (response.length > 0) { assembly { let returndata_size := mload(response) revert(add(32, response), returndata_size) } } else { revert CustomErrors.LOW_LEVEL_CALL_FAILED(); } } results[i] = response; } return results; }
Funnily enough, the custom error CustomErrors.TARGETS_LENGTH_DIFFERENT_THAN_DATA_LENGTH
already exists but is unused.
#0 - RayXpub
2022-08-10T13:51:53Z
Although we recongize this could be a user generated issue we disagree with the severity and think it should be downgraded to QA. We do intend to add an explicit check for the lengths of the two arrays to be equal as recommended.
#1 - RayXpub
2022-08-11T13:02:12Z
This is actually a duplicate of #113 which is marked as QA
#2 - gzeoneth
2022-08-21T15:18:22Z
Agree this is QA for input sanitization.