Platform: Code4rena
Start Date: 25/08/2022
Pot Size: $75,000 USDC
Total HM: 35
Participants: 147
Period: 7 days
Judge: 0xean
Total Solo HM: 15
Id: 156
League: ETH
Rank: 119/147
Findings: 1
Award: $54.31
🌟 Selected for report: 0
🚀 Solo Findings: 0
🌟 Selected for report: zzzitron
Also found by: 0x040, 0x1f8b, 0x52, 0x85102, 0xDjango, 0xNazgul, 0xNineDec, 0xSky, 0xSmartContract, 0xkatana, 8olidity, Aymen0909, Bahurum, BipinSah, Bnke0x0, CRYP70, CertoraInc, Ch_301, Chandr, Chom, CodingNameKiki, Deivitto, DimSon, Diraco, ElKu, EthLedger, Funen, GalloDaSballo, Guardian, IllIllI, JansenC, Jeiwan, Lambda, LeoS, Margaret, MasterCookie, PPrieditis, PaludoX0, Picodes, PwnPatrol, RaymondFam, ReyAdmirado, Rohan16, Rolezn, Ruhum, Sm4rty, StevenL, The_GUILD, TomJ, Tomo, Trust, Waze, __141345__, ajtra, ak1, apostle0x01, aviggiano, bin2chen, bobirichman, brgltd, c3phas, cRat1st0s, carlitox477, cccz, ch13fd357r0y3r, cloudjunky, cryptphi, csanuragjain, d3e4, datapunk, delfin454000, devtooligan, dipp, djxploit, durianSausage, eierina, enckrish, erictee, fatherOfBlocks, gogo, grGred, hansfriese, hyh, ignacio, indijanc, itsmeSTYJ, ladboy233, lukris02, martin, medikko, mics, natzuu, ne0n, nxrblsrpr, okkothejawa, oyc_109, p_crypt0, pfapostol, prasantgupta52, rajatbeladiya, rbserver, reassor, ret2basic, robee, rokinot, rvierdiiev, shenwilly, sikorico, sorrynotsorry, tnevler, tonisives, w0Lfrum, yixxas
54.313 DAI - $54.31
Deprecated in favor of safeIncreaseAllowance() and safeDecreaseAllowance().Whenever possible, use {safeIncreaseAllowance} and {safeDecreaseAllowance} instead.
//Links to github Files: Operator.sol:L167 BondCallback.sol:L57
Actual Codes Used
src/policies/Operator.sol:167: ohm.safeApprove(address(MINTR), type(uint256).max); src/policies/BondCallback.sol:57: ohm.safeApprove(address(MINTR), type(uint256).max);
Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively. The pragma declared across the solution is ^0.8.0 As the compiler introduces a several interesting upgrades in newer versions of Solidity consider locking at this version or a more recent one.
//Links to github Files: IBondCallback.sol:L2 IOperator.sol:L2 IHeart.sol:L2
Actual Codes Used
src/interfaces/IBondCallback.sol:2:pragma solidity >=0.8.0; src/policies/interfaces/IOperator.sol:2:pragma solidity >=0.8.0; src/policies/interfaces/IHeart.sol:2:pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
The nonReentrant modifier should occur before all other modifiers This is a best-practice to protect against re-entrancy in other modifiers
// Links To Github Files: Operator.sol:L276
Actual Codes Used
src/policies/Operator.sol:276: ) external override onlyWhileActive nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountOut) {
using the nonReentrant modifier before onlyWhileActive modifier
_mint()
is discouraged in favor of _safeMint()
which ensures that the recipient is either an EOA or implements IERC721Receiver
.
// Links To Github Files: VOTES.sol:L36
Actual Codes Used
src/modules/VOTES.sol:36: _mint(wallet_, amount_);
Use _safeMint() instead of _mint().
It is good to add a require() statement that checks the return value of token transfers or to use something like OpenZeppelin’s safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom unless one is sure the given token reverts in case of a failure. Failure to do so will cause silent failures of transfers and affect token accounting in contract.
//Links to github Files: Governance.sol:L79 Governance.sol:L259 Governance.sol:L312
Actual Codes Used
src/policies/Governance.sol:79: requests[1] = Permissions(VOTES.KEYCODE(), VOTES.transferFrom.selector); src/policies/Governance.sol:259: VOTES.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), userVotes); src/policies/Governance.sol:312: VOTES.transferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, userVotes);
Consider using safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom or require() consistently.
The attacker can initialize the contract, take malicious actions, and allow it to be re-initialized by the project without any error being noticed.
// Links to githubfile PriceConfig.sol:L45 Operator.sol:L598 IOperator.sol:L125
Actual Codes Used
src/policies/PriceConfig.sol:45: function initialize(uint256[] memory startObservations_, uint48 lastObservationTime_) src/policies/Operator.sol:598: function initialize() external onlyRole("operator_admin") { src/policies/interfaces/IOperator.sol:125: function initialize() external;
Code architecture, incentives, and error handling/reporting questions/issues should be resolved before deployment
// Link to Github files: Operator.sol:L657 TreasuryCustodian.sol:L51 TreasuryCustodian.sol:L52 TreasuryCustodian.sol:L56
Actual Codes Used
src/policies/Operator.sol:657: /// TODO determine if this should use the last price from the MA or recalculate the current price, ideally last price is ok since it should have been just updated and should include check against secondary? src/policies/TreasuryCustodian.sol:51: // TODO Currently allows anyone to revoke any approval EXCEPT activated policies. src/policies/TreasuryCustodian.sol:52: // TODO must reorg policy storage to be able to check for deactivated policies. src/policies/TreasuryCustodian.sol:56: // TODO Make sure `policy_` is an actual policy and not a random address.
Impact - Non-Critical
Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the Entropy Illusion for further details), locking funds for periods of time, and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent. Miners have the ability to adjust timestamps slightly, which can prove to be dangerous if block timestamps are used incorrectly in smart contracts.
// Link to Github files: PRICE.sol:L143 PRICE.sol:L146 PRICE.sol:L165 PRICE.sol:L171 PRICE.sol:L215 RANGE.sol:L85 RANGE.sol:L92 RANGE.sol:L136 RANGE.sol:L138 RANGE.sol:L148 RANGE.sol:L150 RANGE.sol:L191 RANGE.sol:L200 RANGE.sol:L207 RANGE.sol:L231 RANGE.sol:L233 Heart.sol:L63 Heart.sol:L94 Heart.sol:L108 Heart.sol:L131 Operator.sol:L128 Operator.sol:L210 Operator.sol:L216 Operator.sol:L404 Operator.sol:L456 Operator.sol:L708 Operator.sol:L720 Governance.sol:L171 Governance.sol:L212 Governance.sol:L227 Governance.sol:L231 Governance.sol:L235 Governance.sol:L272
Actual Codes Used
src/modules/PRICE.sol:143: lastObservationTime = uint48(block.timestamp); src/modules/PRICE.sol:146: emit NewObservation(block.timestamp, currentPrice, _movingAverage); src/modules/PRICE.sol:165: if (updatedAt < block.timestamp - 3 * uint256(observationFrequency)) src/modules/PRICE.sol:171: if (updatedAt < block.timestamp - uint256(observationFrequency)) src/modules/PRICE.sol:215: if (startObservations_.length != numObs || lastObservationTime_ > uint48(block.timestamp)) src/modules/RANGE.sol:85: lastActive: uint48(block.timestamp), src/modules/RANGE.sol:92: lastActive: uint48(block.timestamp), src/modules/RANGE.sol:136: _range.high.lastActive = uint48(block.timestamp); src/modules/RANGE.sol:138: emit WallDown(true, block.timestamp, capacity_); src/modules/RANGE.sol:148: _range.low.lastActive = uint48(block.timestamp); src/modules/RANGE.sol:150: emit WallDown(false, block.timestamp, capacity_); src/modules/RANGE.sol:191: lastActive: uint48(block.timestamp), src/modules/RANGE.sol:200: lastActive: uint48(block.timestamp), src/modules/RANGE.sol:207: emit WallUp(high_, block.timestamp, capacity_); src/modules/RANGE.sol:231: emit CushionDown(high_, block.timestamp); src/modules/RANGE.sol:233: emit CushionUp(high_, block.timestamp, marketCapacity_); src/policies/Heart.sol:63: lastBeat = block.timestamp; src/policies/Heart.sol:94: if (block.timestamp < lastBeat + frequency()) revert Heart_OutOfCycle(); src/policies/Heart.sol:108: emit Beat(block.timestamp); src/policies/Heart.sol:131: lastBeat = block.timestamp - frequency(); src/policies/Operator.sol:128: lastRegen: uint48(block.timestamp), src/policies/Operator.sol:210: uint48(block.timestamp) >= RANGE.lastActive(true) + uint48(config_.regenWait) && src/policies/Operator.sol:216: uint48(block.timestamp) >= RANGE.lastActive(false) + uint48(config_.regenWait) && src/policies/Operator.sol:404: conclusion: uint48(block.timestamp + config_.cushionDuration), src/policies/Operator.sol:456: conclusion: uint48(block.timestamp + config_.cushionDuration), src/policies/Operator.sol:708: _status.high.lastRegen = uint48(block.timestamp); src/policies/Operator.sol:720: _status.low.lastRegen = uint48(block.timestamp); src/policies/Governance.sol:171: block.timestamp, src/policies/Governance.sol:212: if (block.timestamp > proposal.submissionTimestamp + ACTIVATION_DEADLINE) { src/policies/Governance.sol:227: if (block.timestamp < activeProposal.activationTimestamp + GRACE_PERIOD) { src/policies/Governance.sol:231: activeProposal = ActivatedProposal(proposalId_, block.timestamp); src/policies/Governance.sol:235: emit ProposalActivated(proposalId_, block.timestamp); src/policies/Governance.sol:272: if (block.timestamp < activeProposal.activationTimestamp + EXECUTION_TIMELOCK) {
Block timestamps should not be used for entropy or generating random numbers—i.e., they should not be the deciding factor (either directly or through some derivation) for winning a game or changing an important state.
Time-sensitive logic is sometimes required; e.g., for unlocking contracts (time-locking), completing an ICO after a few weeks, or enforcing expiry dates. It is sometimes recommended to use block.number and an average block time to estimate times; with a 10 second block time, 1 week equates to approximately, 60480 blocks. Thus, specifying a block number at which to change a contract state can be more secure, as miners are unable to easily manipulate the block number.