Astaria contest - kaden's results

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/LienToken.sol#L340

Vulnerability details

Description:

When a lien is initially created, the liquidationInitialAsk can be set as any uint256 value >= the amount of underlying borrowed. Later on however, if the position is liquidated, an auction is created which casts the liquidationInitialAsk value to a uint88. Taking a look at the function in SafeCastLib.sol, we can see that if the value is greater than the max uint88 value, execution is reverted:

function safeCastTo88(uint256 x) internal pure returns (uint88 y) {
  require(x < 1 << 88);

  y = uint88(x);
}

This reversion prevents auctions from ever being initialized, and since the only way to retrieve the collateral after the loan has expired is through auction, the collateral is permanently locked in the contract.

For reference, setting the initialLiquidationAsk > 309,485,009.8213451 DAI would trigger this error, and with a lesser value or higher decimal collateral, this may require a much lower USD equivalent. Additionally, setting a price this high is not particularly unrealistic considering it's the starting price for a dutch auction in which it should be intentionally priced much higher than it's worth.

Proof of Concept:

We can create the following test in AstariaTest.t.sol to verify:

function testCannotLiquidateTooHighInitialAsk() public {
  TestNFT nft = new TestNFT(3);
  vm.label(address(nft), "nft");
  address tokenContract = address(nft);
  uint256 tokenId = uint256(1);
  address publicVault = _createPublicVault({
    strategist: strategistOne,
    delegate: strategistTwo,
    epochLength: 14 days
  });

  _lendToVault(
    Lender({addr: address(1), amountToLend: 50 ether}),
    publicVault
  );

  uint256 vaultTokenBalance = IERC20(publicVault).balanceOf(address(1));
  ILienToken.Stack[] memory stack;
  (, stack) = _commitToLien({
    vault: publicVault,
    strategist: strategistOne,
    strategistPK: strategistOnePK,
    tokenContract: tokenContract,
    tokenId: tokenId,
    lienDetails: ILienToken.Details({
      maxAmount: 50 ether,
      rate: (uint256(1e16) * 150) / (365 days),
      duration: 10 days,
      maxPotentialDebt: 0 ether,
      liquidationInitialAsk: type(uint256).max
    }),
    amount: 5 ether,
    isFirstLien: true
  });

  uint256 collateralId = tokenContract.computeId(tokenId);

  skip(14 days); // end of loan
  vm.expectRevert();
  OrderParameters memory listedOrder = ASTARIA_ROUTER.liquidate(
    stack,
    uint8(0)
  );
}

Remediation:

This can be avoided by using a uint256 as the auctionData.startAmount.

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/AstariaRouter.sol#L740 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/PublicVault.sol#L597

Vulnerability details

Description:

There exists no maximum vault fee that strategists can set. As a result, when payments are made, the proportional share LPs own of the vault tokens can be diluted to the point that they cannot redeem any underlying tokens for their position. This may be intentionally designed, allowing LPs to choose for themselves which vaults to provide liquidity for, but it's important to consider how this may go unnoticed. Consider for example an attacker sets the vault fee so high that it exceeds the MAX_SAFE_INTEGER in javascript, causing the frontend to fail to warn prospective LPs.

Remediation:

Add a maximum vault fee, or at least clearly document that strategists may set any fee, even leading to LPs losing their entire deposit.

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/CollateralToken.sol#L526

Vulnerability details

Description:

CollateralToken.settleAuction intends to enforce that both an auction exists for the collateralId and the ClearingHouse is the owner of the collateral, but instead it enforces only one of them by only reverting if they're both invalid.

Remediation:

if (
  s.collateralIdToAuction[collateralId] == bytes32(0) &&
  ERC721(s.idToUnderlying[collateralId].tokenContract).ownerOf(
    s.idToUnderlying[collateralId].tokenId
  ) !=
  s.clearingHouse[collateralId]
) {
  revert InvalidCollateralState(InvalidCollateralStates.NO_AUCTION);
}

Should be replaced with

if (
  s.collateralIdToAuction[collateralId] == bytes32(0) ||
  ERC721(s.idToUnderlying[collateralId].tokenContract).ownerOf(
    s.idToUnderlying[collateralId].tokenId
  ) !=
  s.clearingHouse[collateralId]
) {
  revert InvalidCollateralState(InvalidCollateralStates.NO_AUCTION);
}

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/AstariaRouter.sol#L518 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/ClearingHouse.sol#L143 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/ClearingHouse.sol#L161 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/PublicVault.sol#L384

Vulnerability details

Description:

ERC20 token transfers used for committing liens, buyouts, repayments, etc. all enforce that the amount sent is as expected, simply assuming the amount received will be the same. With fee on transfer tokens, this will lead to a lesser amount received for each party on each exchange of the token. This can cause unexpected effects in the accounting logic and lead to loss of funds.

Remediation:

Remediate by checking balances after transfer or clearly documenting the risk of fee on transfer tokens.

Incorrect inline documentation

Severity: Low

Description:

• AstariaVaultBase.sol contains incorrect comments as to where the args end
• VaultImplementation._validateCommitment documents that the party approved to borrow must receive the funds but this is not enforced in the code
• Misplaced comments in PublicVault._redeemFutureEpoch
• Missing natspec parameters in AstariaRouter._newVault

Unused variable

Severity: Low

Context:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/PublicVault.sol#L262

Description:

assets is unused.

SafeTransferLib may allow code to succeed with a non-existent token contract

Severity: Low

Description:

As documented in solmate/SafeTransferLib.sol:

/// @dev Note that none of the functions in this library check that a token has code at all! That responsibility is delegated to the caller.

SafeTransferLib uses low level calls to interact with the token contracts. Low level calls will succeed if there is no code, which can lead to methods proceeding successfully when they ought not to.

_safeMint should be used rather than _mint wherever possible

Severity: Low

Description:

_mint is discouraged in favor of _safeMint which ensures that the recipient is either an EOA or implements IERC721Receiver. Both OpenZeppelin and solmate have versions of this function so that NFTs aren’t lost if they’re minted to contracts that cannot transfer them back out.

Avoid unnecessarily updating vars

Severity: Gas Optimization

Context:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/LienToken.sol#L525

Description:

In the following code segment we increment payment and totalSpent by spent:

unchecked {
  spent = _paymentAH(s, token, stack, i, payment, payer);
  totalSpent += spent;
  payment -= spent;
  ++i;
}

Instead, we can simply increment totalSpent then use that to compute payment on the fly:

unchecked {
  spent = _paymentAH(s, token, stack, i, payment - totalSpent, payer);
  totalSpent += spent;
  ++i;
}

Cache payment token balance in ClearingHouse._execute

Severity: Gas Optimization

Context:

• https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-astaria/blob/1bfc58b42109b839528ab1c21dc9803d663df898/src/ClearingHouse.sol#L160

Description:

In the following code block:

if (ERC20(paymentToken).balanceOf(address(this)) > 0) {
  ERC20(paymentToken).safeTransfer(
    ASTARIA_ROUTER.COLLATERAL_TOKEN().ownerOf(collateralId),
    ERC20(paymentToken).balanceOf(address(this))
  );
}

Instead of retrieving the payment token balance twice, we can simply cache it:

uint256 paymentTokenBalance = ERC20(paymentToken).balanceOf(address(this));

if (paymentTokenBalance > 0) {
  ERC20(paymentToken).safeTransfer(
    ASTARIA_ROUTER.COLLATERAL_TOKEN().ownerOf(collateralId),
    paymentTokenBalance
  );
}

Static Analysis Findings

Use assembly to hash instead of Solidity

contract GasTest is DSTest {
    Contract0 c0;
    Contract1 c1;

    function setUp() public {
        c0 = new Contract0();
        c1 = new Contract1();
    }

    function testGas() public view {
        c0.solidityHash(2309349, 2304923409);
        c1.assemblyHash(2309349, 2304923409);
    }
}

contract Contract0 {
    function solidityHash(uint256 a, uint256 b) public view {
        //unoptimized
        keccak256(abi.encodePacked(a, b));
    }
}

contract Contract1 {
    function assemblyHash(uint256 a, uint256 b) public view {
        //optimized
        assembly {
            mstore(0x00, a)
            mstore(0x20, b)
            let hashedVal := keccak256(0x00, 0x40)
        }
    }
}

Gas Report

╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract0 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 36687              ┆ 214             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ solidityHash       ┆ 313             ┆ 313 ┆ 313    ┆ 313 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract1 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 31281              ┆ 186             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ assemblyHash       ┆ 231             ┆ 231 ┆ 231    ┆ 231 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯

Lines

• AstariaRouter.sol:63
• LienToken.sol:405
• LienToken.sol:271
• LienToken.sol:562
• LienToken.sol:228
• LienToken.sol:448
• LienToken.sol:51
• LienToken.sol:697
• WithdrawProxy.sol:50
• ClearingHouse.sol:41
• PublicVault.sol:54
• AuthInitializable.sol:27
• VaultImplementation.sol:247
• VaultImplementation.sol:183
• VaultImplementation.sol:48
• VaultImplementation.sol:51
• VaultImplementation.sol:45
• VaultImplementation.sol:58
• VaultImplementation.sol:154
• CollateralToken.sol:310
• CollateralToken.sol:519
• CollateralToken.sol:124
• CollateralToken.sol:74

Use multiple require() statments insted of require(expression && expression && ...)

You can safe gas by breaking up a require statement with multiple conditions, into multiple require statements with a single condition.

contract GasTest is DSTest {
    Contract0 c0;
    Contract1 c1;

    function setUp() public {
        c0 = new Contract0();
        c1 = new Contract1();
    }

    function testGas() public {
        c0.singleRequire(3);
        c1.multipleRequire(3);
    }
}

contract Contract0 {
    function singleRequire(uint256 num) public {
        require(num > 1 && num < 10 && num == 3);
    }
}

contract Contract1 {
    function multipleRequire(uint256 num) public {
        require(num > 1);
        require(num < 10);
        require(num == 3);
    }
}

Gas Report

╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract0 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 35487              ┆ 208             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ singleRequire      ┆ 286             ┆ 286 ┆ 286    ┆ 286 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract1 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 35887              ┆ 210             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ multipleRequire    ┆ 270             ┆ 270 ┆ 270    ┆ 270 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯

Lines

• Vault.sol:65
• PublicVault.sol:672
• PublicVault.sol:687

Use assembly for math (add, sub, mul, div)

Use assembly for math instead of Solidity. You can check for overflow/underflow in assembly to ensure safety. If using Solidity versions < 0.8.0 and you are using Safemath, you can gain significant gas savings by using assembly to calculate values and checking for overflow/underflow.

contract GasTest is DSTest {
    Contract0 c0;
    Contract1 c1;
    Contract2 c2;
    Contract3 c3;
    Contract4 c4;
    Contract5 c5;
    Contract6 c6;
    Contract7 c7;

    function setUp() public {
        c0 = new Contract0();
        c1 = new Contract1();
        c2 = new Contract2();
        c3 = new Contract3();
        c4 = new Contract4();
        c5 = new Contract5();
        c6 = new Contract6();
        c7 = new Contract7();
    }

    function testGas() public {
        c0.addTest(34598345, 100);
        c1.addAssemblyTest(34598345, 100);
        c2.subTest(34598345, 100);
        c3.subAssemblyTest(34598345, 100);
        c4.mulTest(34598345, 100);
        c5.mulAssemblyTest(34598345, 100);
        c6.divTest(34598345, 100);
        c7.divAssemblyTest(34598345, 100);
    }
}

contract Contract0 {
    //addition in Solidity
    function addTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        uint256 c = a + b;
    }
}

contract Contract1 {
    //addition in assembly
    function addAssemblyTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        assembly {
            let c := add(a, b)

            if lt(c, a) {
                mstore(0x00, "overflow")
                revert(0x00, 0x20)
            }
        }
    }
}

contract Contract2 {
    //subtraction in Solidity
    function subTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        uint256 c = a - b;
    }
}

contract Contract3 {
    //subtraction in assembly
    function subAssemblyTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        assembly {
            let c := sub(a, b)

            if gt(c, a) {
                mstore(0x00, "underflow")
                revert(0x00, 0x20)
            }
        }
    }
}

contract Contract4 {
    //multiplication in Solidity
    function mulTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        uint256 c = a * b;
    }
}

contract Contract5 {
    //multiplication in assembly
    function mulAssemblyTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        assembly {
            let c := mul(a, b)

            if lt(c, a) {
                mstore(0x00, "overflow")
                revert(0x00, 0x20)
            }
        }
    }
}

contract Contract6 {
    //division in Solidity
    function divTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        uint256 c = a * b;
    }
}

contract Contract7 {
    //division in assembly
    function divAssemblyTest(uint256 a, uint256 b) public pure {
        assembly {
            let c := div(a, b)

            if gt(c, a) {
                mstore(0x00, "underflow")
                revert(0x00, 0x20)
            }
        }
    }
}

Gas Report

╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract0 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 40493              ┆ 233             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ addTest            ┆ 303             ┆ 303 ┆ 303    ┆ 303 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract1 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 37087              ┆ 216             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ addAssemblyTest    ┆ 263             ┆ 263 ┆ 263    ┆ 263 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract2 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 40293              ┆ 232             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ subTest            ┆ 300             ┆ 300 ┆ 300    ┆ 300 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract3 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 37287              ┆ 217             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ subAssemblyTest    ┆ 263             ┆ 263 ┆ 263    ┆ 263 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract4 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 41893              ┆ 240             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ mulTest            ┆ 325             ┆ 325 ┆ 325    ┆ 325 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract5 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 37087              ┆ 216             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ mulAssemblyTest    ┆ 265             ┆ 265 ┆ 265    ┆ 265 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract6 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 41893              ┆ 240             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ divTest            ┆ 325             ┆ 325 ┆ 325    ┆ 325 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯
╭────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮
│ Contract7 contract ┆                 ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
╞════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡
│ Deployment Cost    ┆ Deployment Size ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ 37287              ┆ 217             ┆     ┆        ┆     ┆         │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ Function Name      ┆ min             ┆ avg ┆ median ┆ max ┆ # calls │
├╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌┼╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┤
│ divAssemblyTest    ┆ 265             ┆ 265 ┆ 265    ┆ 265 ┆ 1       │
╰────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────┴────────┴─────┴─────────╯

Lines

• AstariaRouter.sol:690
• AstariaRouter.sol:630
• AstariaRouter.sol:63
• AstariaRouter.sol:115
• AstariaRouter.sol:700
• AstariaRouter.sol:112
• AstariaRouter.sol:700
• AstariaRouter.sol:115
• AstariaRouter.sol:112
• AstariaRouter.sol:404
• AstariaRouter.sol:698
• LienToken.sol:868
• LienToken.sol:817
• LienToken.sol:262
• LienToken.sol:523
• LienToken.sol:779
• LienToken.sol:154
• LienToken.sol:453
• LienToken.sol:193
• LienToken.sol:468
• LienToken.sol:591
• LienToken.sol:51
• LienToken.sol:860
• LienToken.sol:780
• LienToken.sol:870
• LienToken.sol:473
• LienToken.sol:765
• LienToken.sol:260
• LienToken.sol:336
• LienToken.sol:637
• WithdrawProxy.sol:50
• WithdrawProxy.sol:260
• WithdrawProxy.sol:264
• WithdrawProxy.sol:264
• WithdrawProxy.sol:314
• WithdrawProxy.sol:255
• WithdrawProxy.sol:260
• ClearingHouse.sol:156
• ClearingHouse.sol:41
• ClearingHouse.sol:150
• PublicVault.sol:704
• PublicVault.sol:503
• PublicVault.sol:398
• PublicVault.sol:719
• PublicVault.sol:691
• PublicVault.sol:704
• PublicVault.sol:676
• PublicVault.sol:293
• PublicVault.sol:402
• PublicVault.sol:548
• PublicVault.sol:332
• PublicVault.sol:491
• PublicVault.sol:622
• PublicVault.sol:367
• PublicVault.sol:227
• PublicVault.sol:648
• PublicVault.sol:704
• PublicVault.sol:553
• PublicVault.sol:674
• PublicVault.sol:323
• PublicVault.sol:492
• PublicVault.sol:689
• PublicVault.sol:637
• PublicVault.sol:449
• PublicVault.sol:523
• PublicVault.sol:54
• PublicVault.sol:548
• PublicVault.sol:710
• PublicVault.sol:163
• PublicVault.sol:553
• PublicVault.sol:553
• AuthInitializable.sol:27
• VaultImplementation.sol:302
• VaultImplementation.sol:58
• CollateralToken.sol:469
• CollateralToken.sol:74