Fractional v2 contest - oyc_109's results

A collective ownership platform for NFTs on Ethereum.

General Information

Platform: Code4rena

Start Date: 07/07/2022

Pot Size: $75,000 USDC

Total HM: 32

Participants: 141

Period: 7 days

Judge: HardlyDifficult

Total Solo HM: 4

Id: 144

League: ETH

Fractional

Findings Distribution

Researcher Performance

Rank: 31/141

Findings: 6

Award: $452.61

🌟 Selected for report: 0

πŸš€ Solo Findings: 0

Findings Information

🌟 Selected for report: xiaoming90

Also found by: 0x52, Lambda, cccz, codexploder, hyh, kenzo, oyc_109, zzzitron

Labels

bug
duplicate
3 (High Risk)

Awards

214.1685 USDC - $214.17

External Links

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/SafeSend.sol#L23

Vulnerability details

check account existence before call()

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/SafeSend.sol#L30-L34

description

the function _sendEthOrWeth() is utilized in a few different places in buyout.sol. According to the Solidity docs), "The low-level functions call, delegatecall and staticcall return true as their first return value if the account called is non-existent, as part of the design of the EVM. Account existence must be checked prior to calling if needed".

since _sendEthOrWeth() makes a call to _attemptETHTransfer() first to transfer ETH, the address _to should be checked for account existence first

otherwise it is possible that call() will fail, but return true

recommendation

check account existance first

require(0 != address(_to).code.length)

#0 - mehtaculous

2022-07-21T15:51:22Z

Duplicate of #649

#1 - HardlyDifficult

2022-08-02T23:53:46Z

Awards

4.9607 USDC - $4.96

Labels

bug
duplicate
2 (Med Risk)

External Links

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L131

Vulnerability details

owner can be changed through unsafe delegatecall

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L131

description

the _execute() function in Vault.sol makes an unsafe delegatecall which could result in the change of owner

delegatecall is called on the _target address which loads the function code from another contract and executes it as if it were its own code

in the _execute() function a check is performed which will revert the transaction if the owner is changed

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L132

however this is insufficient protection against change of ownership, as delegatecall can be used to change other storage variables of the contract

for example, delegatecall can change the nonce to set it back to 0

then the attacker can call the init() function again to take over the contract on the next transaction

other storage variables that could also negatively impact the proper functioning of the Vault could be merkleRoot and methods

changing any of these storage variables could disrupt the normal functioning of the Vault without changing the owner directly

recommendation

reconsider the design of making unsafe delegatecalls to other addresses

or validate that other key storage variables remain unchanged during the call

#0 - ecmendenhall

2022-07-15T03:44:51Z

#1 - HardlyDifficult

2022-07-27T00:00:53Z

Duping to #487

Findings Information

🌟 Selected for report: 0xNineDec

Also found by: Franfran, Ruhum, neumo, oyc_109, pashov

Labels

bug
duplicate
2 (Med Risk)

Awards

132.2028 USDC - $132.20

External Links

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L223

Vulnerability details

no upper bound on royaltyPercent

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L223

description

the function setRoyalties() in FERC1155.sol does not have a sanity check for the value that can be set for royaltyPercent[_id]

royalties can potentially be set to over 100% which will make the user lose funds

recommendation

set a upper bound for _percentage in setRoyalties()`

#0 - 0x0aa0

2022-07-18T18:40:45Z

Duplicate of #166

Awards

1.3977 USDC - $1.40

Labels

bug
duplicate
2 (Med Risk)

External Links

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L172

Vulnerability details

call instead of transfer

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L172

The use of the deprecated transfer() function for an address will inevitably make the transaction fail when:

  1. The claimer smart contract does not implement a payable function.

  2. The claimer smart contract does implement a payable fallback which uses more than 2300 gas unit.

  3. The claimer smart contract implements a payable fallback function that needs less than 2300 gas units but is called through proxy, raising the call's gas usage above 2300.

Additionally, using higher than 2300 gas might be mandatory for some multisig wallets.

recommendation

Use call() instead of transfer() to send ether. And return value must be checked to see if the call is successful. Sending ether with the transfer is no longer recommended.

#0 - mehtaculous

2022-07-21T15:47:15Z

Duplicate of #325

#1 - HardlyDifficult

2022-07-28T15:48:50Z

Duping to #504

no validation of ethAmount

description

in the function sellFractions() there is no validation that there is enough ETH in the vault to exchange for fractional tokens for the _amount that is being transferred from msg.sender

if there is not enough ETH in the vault an underflow will occur when decreasing ethBalance

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L139

cannot withdraw to another address

description

in the function leave() ETH is transferred to msg.sender

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L172

if the sender is a contract that cannot handle ETH the funds can be stuck, recommend adding a parameter to give the option for the user to withdraw to another address

Use of Block.timestamp

description

Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the Entropy Illusion for further details), locking funds for periods of time, and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent. Miners have the ability to adjust timestamps slightly, which can prove to be dangerous if block timestamps are used incorrectly in smart contracts.

recommendation

Block timestamps should not be used for entropy or generating random numbersβ€”i.e., they should not be the deciding factor (either directly or through some derivation) for winning a game or changing an important state.

Time-sensitive logic is sometimes required; e.g., for unlocking contracts (time-locking), completing an ICO after a few weeks, or enforcing expiry dates. It is sometimes recommended to use block.number and an average block time to estimate times; with a 10 second block time, 1 week equates to approximately, 60480 blocks. Thus, specifying a block number at which to change a contract state can be more secure, as miners are unable to easily manipulate the block number.

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L108 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L154 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L125 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L162 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L203 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L194

missing checks for zero address

description

Checking addresses against zero-address during initialization or during setting is a security best-practice. However, such checks are missing in address variable initializations/changes in many places.

Impact: Allowing zero-addresses will lead to contract reverts and force redeployments if there are no setters for such address variables.

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L209 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L222 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L47-L49 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L53-L60 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Minter.sol#L18 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/protoforms/BaseVault.sol#L25 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/references/SupplyReference.sol#L16 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/targets/Supply.sol#L17 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/Metadata.sol#L17

use of magic numbers

description

constants should be declared rather than use magic numbers

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/FERC1155.sol#L247 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L86-L87 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L209-L211 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L452 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L199

Unused receive() function

description

If the intention is for the Ether to be used, the function should call another function, otherwise it should revert

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L32 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L53 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Migration.sol#L63

array length validation

description

in install() there is no validation that the two arrays passed in as function parameters have the same length

this could cause methods not to be updated or the function call to fail

emit could also emit the wrong information

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L77

for loop optimisations

description

Uninitialized variables are assigned with the types default value.

Explicitly initializing a variable with it's default value costs unnecessary gas.

Suggest not initializing the for loop counter to 0.

An array’s length should be cached to save gas in for-loops

Reading array length at each iteration of the loop takes 6 gas (3 for mload and 3 to place memory_offset) in the stack.

Caching the array length in the stack saves around 3 gas per iteration.

Suggest storing the array’s length in a variable before the for-loop, and use it instead:

++i costs less gas compared to i++

++i costs less gas compared to i++ for unsigned integer, as pre-increment is cheaper (about 5 gas per iteration)

Suggest using ++i instead of i++ to increment the value of an uint variable.

Increments can be unchecked

In Solidity 0.8+, there’s a default overflow check on unsigned integers. It’s possible to uncheck this in for-loops and save some gas at each iteration, but at the cost of some code readability, as this uncheck cannot be made inline.

taking all of the above, the recommended format for gas savings is

for (uint256 i; i < numIterations;) { // ... unchecked { ++i; } }

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L78 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L104 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/protoforms/BaseVault.sol#L64 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/protoforms/BaseVault.sol#L83 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/protoforms/BaseVault.sol#L107 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/MerkleBase.sol#L51

use calldata instead of memory

description

Use calldata instead of memory for function parameters saves gas if the function argument is only read.

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L73 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/Vault.sol#L101 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/VaultRegistry.sol#L53-L54 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/VaultRegistry.sol#L70-L71 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/VaultRegistry.sol#L85-L86 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/VaultRegistry.sol#L105-L106 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/VaultRegistry.sol#L150-L151 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/VaultRegistry.sol#L168-L169 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/Metadata.sol#L24 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/MerkleBase.sol#L61 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/MerkleBase.sol#L125

cache in variables instead of loading

description

The code can be optimized by minimising the number of SLOADs. SLOADs are expensive (100 gas) compared to MLOADs/MSTOREs (3 gas).

findings

array.length https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/Buyout.sol#L454 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/protoforms/BaseVault.sol#L130 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/modules/protoforms/BaseVault.sol#L132 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/MerkleBase.sol#L110

use shift operator

description

Gas can be saved by using >> operator instead of dividing by 2

use >> operator

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/MerkleBase.sol#L100

using prefix increments save gas

description

Prefix increments are cheaper than postfix increments, eg ++i rather than i++

findings

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/e2c5a962a94106f9495eb96769d7f60f7d5b14c9/src/utils/MerkleBase.sol#L188

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