Ondo Finance - Omik's results

Institutional-Grade Finance, Now Onchain.

General Information

Platform: Code4rena

Start Date: 29/03/2024

Pot Size: $36,500 USDC

Total HM: 5

Participants: 72

Period: 5 days

Judge: 3docSec

Total Solo HM: 1

Id: 357

League: ETH

Ondo Finance

Findings Distribution

Researcher Performance

Rank: 51/72

Findings: 1

Award: $8.28

🌟 Selected for report: 0

🚀 Solo Findings: 0

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-ondo-finance/blob/main/contracts/ousg/ousgInstantManager.sol#L319

Vulnerability details

Impact

The OUSGInstantManager allowed KYC'ed user to mint OUSG by providing USDC. The provided USDC will be transferred to the usdcReceiver , in exchange that the KYC'ed user will be minted OUSG accordingly, based on the price data.

USDC contract on Ethereum (https://etherscan.io/token/0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48#writeProxyContract) has a blacklist functionalities that prevent the blacklisted address to transfer their funds (out and in).

Since the usdcReceiver will be receiving USDC from the user, its important to make this address mutable, and add a function that can be called by the dafult_admin_role to change the usdcReceiver address. Because if the usdcReceiver ever get blacklisted in the USDC, the KYC'ed user wont be able to mint their OUSG with USDC.

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-ondo-finance/blob/main/contracts/ousg/ousgInstantManager.sol#L319

Tools Used

Manual

Assessed type

Other

#0 - c4-pre-sort

2024-04-04T23:18:04Z

0xRobocop marked the issue as duplicate of #227

#1 - c4-judge

2024-04-09T09:18:55Z

3docSec changed the severity to QA (Quality Assurance)

#2 - c4-judge

2024-04-10T07:28:57Z

3docSec marked the issue as grade-b

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