Platform: Code4rena
Start Date: 29/06/2022
Pot Size: $50,000 USDC
Total HM: 20
Participants: 133
Period: 5 days
Judge: hickuphh3
Total Solo HM: 1
Id: 142
League: ETH
Rank: 29/133
Findings: 3
Award: $488.82
🌟 Selected for report: 0
🚀 Solo Findings: 0
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-06-putty/blob/3b6b844bc39e897bd0bbb69897f2deff12dc3893/contracts/src/PuttyV2.sol#L454 https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-06-putty/blob/3b6b844bc39e897bd0bbb69897f2deff12dc3893/contracts/src/PuttyV2.sol#L593-L603
If some asset in order.erc20Assets amount is set to zero, user cannot execute _transferERC20sIn
There is no check for order.erc20Assets amount.
function _transferERC20sIn(ERC20Asset[] memory assets, address from) internal { for (uint256 i = 0; i < assets.length; i++) { address token = assets[i].token; uint256 tokenAmount = assets[i].tokenAmount; require(token.code.length > 0, "ERC20: Token is not contract"); require(tokenAmount > 0, "ERC20: Amount too small"); ERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), tokenAmount); } }
If user call _transferERC20sIn
when order.erc20Assets has zero amount asset, will revert.
VS Code
check order.erc20Assets has zero amount asset
#0 - outdoteth
2022-07-07T13:41:31Z
Duplicate: Setting an erc20Asset with a zero amount or with no code at the address will result in a revert when exercising a put option: https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-06-putty-findings/issues/223
🌟 Selected for report: xiaoming90
Also found by: 0x1f8b, 0x29A, 0x52, 0xDjango, 0xNazgul, 0xNineDec, 0xSolus, 0xf15ers, 0xsanson, AmitN, Bnke0x0, BowTiedWardens, Chom, David_, ElKu, Funen, GalloDaSballo, GimelSec, Hawkeye, IllIllI, JC, JohnSmith, Kaiziron, Kenshin, Lambda, Limbooo, MadWookie, Metatron, MiloTruck, Nethermind, Picodes, ReyAdmirado, Sneakyninja0129, StErMi, TomJ, Treasure-Seeker, TrungOre, Waze, Yiko, _Adam, __141345__, antonttc, async, aysha, catchup, cccz, cryptphi, csanuragjain, danb, datapunk, defsec, delfin454000, dirk_y, doddle0x, durianSausage, exd0tpy, fatherOfBlocks, gogo, hake, hansfriese, horsefacts, hubble, itsmeSTYJ, joestakey, oyc_109, pedroais, peritoflores, rajatbeladiya, reassor, robee, rokinot, samruna, saneryee, sashik_eth, shenwilly, shung, simon135, sseefried, unforgiven, zer0dot, zzzitron
47.1302 USDC - $47.13
There is user callback in _transferERC721sOut.
function _transferERC721sOut(ERC721Asset[] memory assets) internal { for (uint256 i = 0; i < assets.length; i++) { ERC721(assets[i].token).safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, assets[i].tokenId); } }
function safeTransferFrom( address from, address to, uint256 id ) public virtual { transferFrom(from, to, id); require( to.code.length == 0 || ERC721TokenReceiver(to).onERC721Received(msg.sender, from, id, "") == ERC721TokenReceiver.onERC721Received.selector, "UNSAFE_RECIPIENT" ); }
Now there is no risk. but using ReentrancyGuard for the future.
🌟 Selected for report: GalloDaSballo
Also found by: 0v3rf10w, 0x1f8b, 0xA5DF, 0xDjango, 0xHarry, 0xKitsune, 0xNazgul, 0xNineDec, 0xc0ffEE, 0xf15ers, 0xkatana, 0xsanson, ACai, Aymen0909, Bnke0x0, BowTiedWardens, Chom, ElKu, Fitraldys, Funen, Haruxe, Hawkeye, IllIllI, JC, JohnSmith, Kaiziron, Kenshin, Lambda, Limbooo, MadWookie, Metatron, MiloTruck, Picodes, PwnedNoMore, Randyyy, RedOneN, ReyAdmirado, Ruhum, Sm4rty, StErMi, StyxRave, TerrierLover, TomJ, Tomio, UnusualTurtle, Waze, Yiko, _Adam, __141345__, ajtra, ak1, apostle0x01, asutorufos, c3phas, cRat1st0s, catchup, codetilda, cryptphi, datapunk, defsec, delfin454000, durianSausage, exd0tpy, fatherOfBlocks, gogo, grrwahrr, hake, hansfriese, horsefacts, ignacio, jayfromthe13th, joestakey, ladboy233, m_Rassska, mektigboy, minhquanym, mrpathfindr, natzuu, oyc_109, rajatbeladiya, reassor, rfa, robee, rokinot, sach1r0, saian, sashik_eth, simon135, slywaters, swit, z3s, zeesaw, zer0dot
21.1705 USDC - $21.17
++i
than i++
in for loop++i
is using less gas than i++